What justice for Rwanda?
gacaca versus truth commission? by Reuchamps, Min
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
African Studies Center ASC Working Papers in African Studies Series
2008
What justice for Rwanda? gacaca
versus truth commission?
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/38758
Boston University
Working Papers in African Studies  No. 259 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What Justice for Rwanda? 
Gacaca  versus Truth Commission? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Min Reuchamps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Papers in African Studies 
African Studies Center 
Boston University 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Boston University or 
the African Studies Center. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Series Editor: Michael DiBlasi 
Production Manager: Sandra McCann 
 
 
 
African Studies Center 
Boston University 
270 Bay State Road 
Boston, MA 02215 
 
Tel: 617-353-7306 
Fax: 617-353-4975 
E-mail: ascpub@bu.edu 
Web: www.bu.edu/africa/publications/index.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2008, by the author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
Working Papers in African Studies  No. 259 (2008) 
 
 
What Justice for Rwanda? 
Gacaca versus Truth Commission?* 
 
By Min Reuchamps 
 
Abstract. In post-genocide Rwanda a truth commission is needed in addition to gacaca courts in order 
to promote justice and foster reconciliation. In the context of transitional justice, retributive justice, 
which seeks justice and focuses on the perpetrators, appears to be inadequate to lead a society towards 
reconciliation. Therefore, some forms of restorative justice, which emphasize the healing of the whole 
society, seem necessary. In Rwanda, gacaca courts and a truth commission are complementary. The 
former can bring justice, the latter can seek the truth; both crucial ingredients of a peaceful future for 
Rwandans. The essay opens with a discussion of the nature of the genocide and the responses to post-
genocide Rwanda’s crisis. The second and third parts present the existent gacaca system and a 
theoretical framework for a truth commission. The combination of both approaches in view of the 
double goal of justice and reconciliation concludes this paper. 
Introduction 
On April 6, 1994, one day after President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President 
Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi were killed in a rocket attack on their plane,1 the Rwandan 
capital of Kigali dissolved into terror and chaos as disparate Hutu troops led by the 
interahamwe as well as police forces, followed by civilians, went on a rampage, killing Tutsi 
and moderate Hutu. In fewer than a hundred days, 800,000 Rwandans throughout the country 
                                                
* The first draft of this paper was written while the author was a Belgian American Educational 
Foundation (B.A.E.F.) fellow and Master’s of Arts candidate in Political Science at Boston University. The 
author is currently Aspirant du Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique-FNRS and Doctoral candidate in Political 
Science at the Université de Liège, Belgium. This paper was presented in Prof. Neta C. Crawford’s seminar 
“Reckoning With The Past: Reparations and Justice in Comparative Perspective,” Boston University, Boston, 
Mass., November 2005, and at the 14th Annual Boston University Graduate Research Conference in African 
Studies, Boston University, Boston, Mass., March, 2006. The author is grateful to Abel Djassi Amado, Prof. 
Neta C. Crawford, Prof. Edouard Bustin, Ceren Ergenc, and Masse Ndiaye as well as the editor of the Working 
Papers in African Studies series, Dr. Michael C. DiBlasi, for their insightful comments on previous drafts. 
However, the paper remains the sole responsibility of the author, who assumes full responsibility for any errors 
in the text. 
1 The two leaders were returning from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, where they and other African leaders 
met in an attempt to end years of ethnic warfare in their countries. According to a Belgian investigation, some 
evidence has emerged that extremist Hutu carried out the attack (in order to spark a coup), and that foreigners 
were also likely involved, though for whom the foreigners were working remains a mystery. 
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lost their lives, four million refugees fled their home to seek protection in camps, located 
inside and outside Rwanda, and innumerable numbers of people either died as an indirect 
result of the genocide through disease, malnutrition, or depression or suffered from non-
deadly violence (e.g., Daly 2002; Des Forges 1999; Drumbl 2000; Gourevitch 1998). 
Everyone in this tiny country of central Africa plunged into the horror, either as a victim or 
as a perpetrator, sometimes as both. After the massacres and the fleeing of the former 
government officials, a multiethnic government, led by the leaders of the so-called rebel 
forces (the Rwandan Patriotic Front), came into power. For the last eleven years, Rwandan 
officials have promoted justice and reconciliation, but the country still faces a very long haul. 
Following the mass killings, national and international trials set out to punish 
perpetrators, promote peace, and foster national reconciliation. However, it soon became 
evident that neither the national judicial system nor the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) could reach—or even approach—these goals. The ICTR suffers from a 
difficult relationship with the Rwandan government, daily dysfunction, internal bureaucratic 
conflict, and insufficient resources, all of which can explain the minuscule figure of fifteen 
verdicts in eleven years. The national judicial system was all but destroyed in terms of 
personnel and infrastructure and thus incapable of coping with the tremendous task of 
judging 130,000 suspects. Therefore, in order to achieve justice and reconciliation, the 
government resurrected, in April 1999, a traditional civil dispute resolution process: gacaca, 
which literally means “justice on the grass or on lawn” in Kinyarwanda and refers to “the 
grass that village elders once sat on as they mediated the disputes of rural life in Rwanda” 
(Fisher 1999a).  
In this article I shall argue that in addition to a truth commission, gacaca courts are 
needed in order to promote justice and, above all, foster reconciliation in post-genocide 
Rwanda. In the context of transitional justice2, retributive justice, which seeks justice and 
focuses on the perpetrators, appears to be inadequate to lead a society towards reconciliation. 
Therefore, some forms of restorative justice, which emphasize the healing of the whole 
society, seem necessary. In Rwanda, gacaca courts and a truth commission, two modes of 
restorative justice, are complementary. The former can bring justice, the latter can seek the 
truth; both are crucial ingredients of a peaceful future for Rwandans. The essay opens with 
the historical context of the genocide as well as a discussion of the nature of the genocide and 
the responses to post-genocide Rwanda’s crisis. The second and third parts present the two 
modes of restorative justice: the existent gacaca system and a theoretical framework for a 
truth commission. A comparison and synthesis of both approaches in view of the dual goals 
of justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda conclude this article.  
                                                
2 Transitional justice is the response to crimes and violations of human rights that occurs “in countries 
emerging from violent conflict or repressive regimes” (Tutu 2007: 6).  
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What Justice for Rwanda? 
A. Pre- and Post-Genocide Rwanda 
Each genocide is unique. Indeed, the experiences of survivors and perpetrators differ, and the 
historical context from which the violence emerged varies from case to case. A second 
proposition derives from this uniqueness: the responses to genocide must be viewed in the 
context of the massacres, and the healing process must meet the needs of the society in order 
to allow it to embark on the path of reconciliation. Therefore, history as well as the social 
geography of post-genocide Rwandan society should determine policy responses to the 
extermination of 800,000 Rwandans. To understand clearly the underlying forces that led to 
the mass murders and assess the responses adopted by the Rwandan government, I shall give 
background information on Rwanda, and the broader historical and political context of the 
genocide. 
1. A Short History of Rwanda 
The inhabitants of the country called Rwanda are known as the “Banyarwanda,” which 
means “the people of Rwanda.” The Banyarawanda consist of three groups of people: the 
Bahutu, the Batutsi, and the Batwa (also known as the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa).3 They 
share the same Bantu language and before the colonial time “lived side by side with each other 
without any ‘Hutuland’ or ‘Tutsiland’ and often intermarried. But they were neither similar nor 
equal” (Prunier 1995: 5). When the first explores came, Banyarwandans had lived together 
for hundreds of years. 
In 1885 the area that later became Rwanda and Burundi was placed under the control 
of Germany—and integrated in German East Africa—by European leaders during the 
Conference of Berlin. After the First World War, Belgium became the administering 
authority of the region under the mandates system of the League of Nations. The Belgian 
authorities kept Rwanda and Burundi in a single administrative entity called the Territory of 
Ruanda-Urundi—until the early 1960’s when Rwanda and Burundi became two independent 
countries.  
In the context of this essay, the extent of the inter-relationship between the Hutu and 
Tutsi is an important issue to examine because it is highly contested and controversial (Daly 
2002: 358–360; Drumbl 2000: 1243–1244). For some, ethnic rivalries between the majority 
Hutu and the minority Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi have been a major ingredient in the life 
and politics of both nations since each became independent from Belgium in 1962.4 The 
Hutu had been subject to the political domination of the minority Tutsi elite in both countries 
long before independence. In Rwanda, after independence and the subsequent civil war, the 
                                                
3 The Twa, accounting for less than 1 percent of the population, are “pygmoids who either lived as hunter-
gatherers in the forested areas or else served the high-ranking personalities and the King in a variety of menial 
tasks” (Prunier 1995: 5).  
4 The Belgians played an important role in the construction of ethnicity in Rwanda. For instance, in 1933–
1934, they introduced identity cards that indicated the ethnicity of the holder.  
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Hutu gained power and held the fate of the country until the mainly Tutsi forces of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—or in French le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR)—
overthrew the official government in July 1994.  
However, the Hutu and Tutsi cannot properly be called distinct ethnic groups, they 
are Banyarwandan. Inter-ethnic marriages were common and mitigated the physical 
characteristics that once distinguished the Tutsi (tall and thin) and the Hutu (short and broad) 
(Gourevitch 1998: 48; Mamdani 2001; Prunier 1995: 370–400). Moreover, they speak the 
same language, worship the same God, and share many of the same cultural traditions. The 
complexity of this situation explains the controversy and debate around the causes of the 
Rwandan genocide.  
Before turning to a narration of the genocide itself, it is important to briefly 
summarize the broader political and historical context of the genocide. As mentioned above, 
the independence of Rwanda in 1962 was followed by a civil war between Hutu and Tutsi 
forces, which led to the massacre of several thousand Tutsi by the Hutu as well as to the 
fleeing of countless Tutsi. Between 1963 and 1990 two Hutu political leaders—in fact, 
dictators—led the country. Gregoire Kayibanda was the president of Rwanda from 1962 to 
1973. Kayibanda’s presidency ended in 1973 when he was overthrown in a bloodless coup 
led by Major General Juvenal Habyarimana. Habyarimana was leader of both the country and 
the sole political party, Le Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Development 
(MRND) from 1973 to 1990. 
In 1990, between 5,000 and 10,000 Tutsi of the RPF invaded Rwanda from 
neighboring Uganda (where most of them fled in the early 1960s) and started a civil war with 
the official government forces (Stedman, Rotchild, and Cousens 2002). One year later, on 
March 29, 1991, the rebels and the official government agreed to a ceasefire. In June, 
political parties were legalized and quickly several parties came into the political arena to 
form a multiparty government in February 1992. This transitional government started peace 
talks in Arusha, Tanzania, with the Tutsi forces of the RPF in July 1992, which led thirteen 
months later, on August 4, 1993, to the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords. This peace 
agreement was supposed to end the three-year civil war in which approximately 10,000 
people died, and to foster political pacification (Khadiagala 2002). However, opposition to 
the agreement grew among the majority Hutu. A few months after the Arusha Accords, on 
April 6, 1994, the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana triggered the mass murders in the 
land of a thousand hills. 
2. The Genocide 
In a mere 100 days, from April 6 through July 4, 1994, 800,000 Rwandans were killed and 
many more were severely injured by other Rwandans (Daly 2002; Des Forges 1999; 
Gourevitch 1998; Mamdani 2001). Mark Drumbl (2000: 1245) argues that the genocide “was 
organized by the Rwandan government, supported by local authorities, and undertaken by 
ordinary men and women.” The violence was driven by a shared rationale, a social norm: 
“the government, and an astounding number of its subjects, imagined that by exterminating 
the Tutsi people they could make the world a better place, and the mass killing had followed” 
(Des Forges 1999: 203). However, the violence can be viewed not only as the result of an 
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ethnic problem but also as a political one. The extremist Hutu leaders planned the massacres 
of both moderate Hutu and Tutsi politicians for fear that they would lose power as a new 
multi-ethnic government ruled the country (Bonner 1994a). 
Whether the violence that occurred in Rwanda from April to July 1994 was ethnic or 
political (probably both), the rest of the world witnessed it but did virtually nothing. The 
failure of humanity filters through Dallaire’s (2003) Shake Hands with the Devil. Lt. Gen. 
Dallaire, like many other authors, holds the international community, especially the first 
world nations and the UN, accountable for failing to prevent the outbreak of the genocide, for 
not intervening while the killings were occurring, and finally for being unable to deal with 
the massive flows of refugees (Barnett 2002; Dallaire 1996). Furthermore, the continued 
indifference of the international community for the Rwanda crisis is apparent in their failure 
to recognize the crisis as genocide and label it as such.5 Although the United Nations, 
through the voice of its general secretary Boutros-Ghali, was angrily condemning the 
massacres and calling them genocide, neither the United States nor the other powers 
described the atrocities committed in Rwanda as genocide, yet they conceded that acts of 
genocide may have occurred.6 Four years afterward, President Clinton acknowledged for the 
first time that “we did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.”7  
3. Post-Genocide Rwanda 
The uncontrollable spasm of lawlessness and terror left Rwanda ravaged by ethnic hatred and 
political turmoil. The newly self-established government quickly called for justice and tried 
to implement a successful regime change. In a post-genocide society such as Rwanda, two 
prominent concerns with regard to justice and reconciliation are raised (Drumbl 2000: 1239). 
On the one hand, the danger of genocide can not disappear unless an institutional structure 
can be designed to accommodate both groups within the same polity. On the other hand, 
punishing past violence may incite more violence. Yet it is vital to allocate responsibility for 
                                                
5 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, General Assembly 
resolution 260 A (III), December 9, 1948. Genocide means “any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the 
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group” (art. 2). The same definition is used in the article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9,* July 17, 1998). 
6 The Western powers refusal to call the Rwandan situation genocide allowed them to avoid the legal 
obligation (stipulated in the 1948 convention, which was ratified—and thus became domestic law—by the 
United States and the other world powers) to prevent the occurrence of genocide or, at least, to contain it and to 
end it. Since the world powers were not willing to get involved in Rwanda, they had to avoid calling the 
atrocities genocide (Lewis 1994a; Jehl 1994; Editorial 1994). 
7 A word that President Clinton used eleven times in a speech given before a Rwandan audience. See 
Weiner 1998.  
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wrongdoing as well as to heal the scars of victims in order to foster reconciliation. Therefore, 
any solution to Rwanda’s post-genocide crisis must be built on a few fundamental premises. 
First, silence is not a sufficient answer (Hayner 2001; Minow 1998). The path to peace and to 
reconciliation requires official responses. Second, the victims as well as the perpetrators 
belong to both groups. Many moderate Hutu were slain alongside Tutsi. And “while Hutu 
constituted the vast majority of the killing population, not all the Hutu were killers nor were 
all the killers Hutu” (Daly 2002: 365). Some Tutsi, especially the RPF troops, are accused of 
committing gross human rights abuses before, during, and after the genocide.8 Finally, the 
change of regime must be taken into account to comprehend the full context of post-genocide 
Rwanda.9 With these premises in mind, we now turn to the study of transitional justice. 
B. Retributive Justice 
 Dealing with past injustices is a crucial test for a society in transition. Jeremy Sarkin argues 
that “the need of victims and the society as a whole to heal from the wounds […] often has to 
be balanced against the new political reality” (Sarkin 2001: 143). As the violence stopped, 
the new Rwandan government wished to proceed with trials for the members of the ousted 
government and for thousands of civilians suspected of taking part in genocidal attacks and 
other human rights violations during the recent civil war. Meanwhile, in an attempt to 
compensate for its failure to intervene during the slaughter, the international community 
agreed to establish an international war crimes tribunal that would prosecute the planners and 
the organizers of the genocide (Lewis 1994b). Thus, national and international trials were to 
assuage Rwanda’s burden via the punishment of the génocidaires. That is retributive justice. 
Retributive justice is punitive. It focuses on the defendant and the adversarial 
relationship between defense and prosecution. Above all, what matters is the fairness of the 
process and the equality and proportionality of the sanctions (Tiemessen 2004: 60). In 
contrast, restorative justice, another mode of transitional justice, focuses on the victim(s) and 
the relationship between the victim(s), the perpetrator(s), and the entire community. 
Restorative justice focuses not only on justice but also, and especially, at reconciliation 
(Braithwaite 1999; Llewellyn and Howse 1999). My intention is to show that Rwanda needs 
restorative justice because retributive justice, although necessary, is not sufficient to heal the 
Rwandan society from its past. The question that follows is what form of restorative justice 
best suits post-genocide Rwanda. First, I discuss why national and international trials are 
insufficient. 
1. The Genocide Trials 
The 1994 genocide was massive, not only because the death toll reached the tremendous 
number of 800,000, but also because almost the same number of people were implicated, 
                                                
8 This is a very sensitive chapter of the genocide’s history. Human Rights Watch estimates the number of 
people killed by Tutsi forces to be at least 25,000 to 30,000 people; see Fisher 1999b. 
9 In Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, the Organization for African Unity (2000a) notes that Hutu were 
terrified of being arrested or killed by the new rulers. 
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with varying degrees of responsibility,10 in the mass killings. In July 1994, the already weak 
Rwandan judicial system was all but destroyed in terms of personnel and infrastructure. The 
judiciary was a primary target of attacks; many judges, attorneys, and lawyers were killed, 
some imprisoned, and others fled into exile (Lorch 1995; Neuffer 2001: 257). Thus, the 
judicial system was not capable of handling the 130,000 Rwandans arrested on suspicion of 
alleged crimes of genocide (although none of these people had been officially charged with a 
crime) who would “require a capable and extensive national court system” (Tiemessen 2004: 
59). The trials did not begin until December 1996, and their fairness has been questioned 
(Sarkin 2001: 157). Defendants often did not have counsel, some trials were concluded in as 
little as four hours, and there have been numerous instances of suspected government 
interference in court decisions. To date, less than ten percent of individuals detained have 
been tried,11 which leaves the other 90 percent languishing in overcrowded prisons serving 
sentences without due process (Amnesty International 2004; Amnesty International 2005; 
McKinley 1997; Schabas 1996; Tiemessen 2004: 59). 
2. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
In November 1994, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha to provide collective response from the international 
community—a response that was never offered during the genocide itself.12 The tribunal is to 
judge persons, of whatever nationality, accused of genocide and crimes against humanity, 
committed from January 1 to December 31, 1994. In the wake of the genocide, the tribunal 
was created to “contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to restoration and 
maintenance of peace.”13 But Martha Minow, professor of law at Harvard University, doubts 
that trials can achieve these goals. She does “not think it wise to claim that international and 
domestic prosecutions for war crimes and other horrors themselves create an international 
moral and legal order, prevent genocides, or forge the political transformation of previously 
oppressive regimes” (Minow1998: 45). However, Richard Goldstone (2005), former 
prosecutor of the tribunal, indicated that the “essential objective” of his office is “to bring 
justice to those most responsible […] for the mass killings,” referring in particular to persons 
in positions of leadership and authority. Thus a division of labor appeared between the 
national and international trials: the prosecution of the architects of the genocide for the 
latter, the prosecution of the rest of the defendants for the former. Nonetheless, in eleven 
                                                
10 Mark Drumbl states that “individual involvement with the genocide occurred at six levels: (1) zealous 
participant, (2) “following orders,” (3) participation under duress, (4) aiding and abetting, (5) passive 
acquiescence, and (6) active opposition” (2000: 1246). 
11 Amongst the 7,000 Rwandans who have been tried: 10 percent received the death sentence (twenty-
three were executed before April 1998, since then no death penalty has been enforced), 30 percent were 
imposed life imprisonment, and acquittals made up about 20 percent of the total. 
12 See the preamble of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(General Assembly resolution 260 A [III], December 9, 1948). 
13 ICTR Statute, preamble. 
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years, the results are meager: fifteen verdicts. Furthermore, the credibility of the institution 
has been hurt by management problems due to insufficient means, internal bureaucratic 
conflicts, lack of respect for international human rights standards regarding the trial rights of 
defendants, and above all a difficult relationship with the Rwandan government. Ultimately, 
instead of providing the symbolic effect of prosecuting even a limited number of leaders, 
“which would have considerable impact on national reconciliation as well as deterrence of 
such crimes in the future” (Akhavan 1997: 339), the ICTR failed to render justice, which 
hinders the much-needed healing process of the Rwandan society.  
3. Towards Restorative Justice 
Facing the tension between justice and reconciliation, the transitional process occurring in 
Rwanda entails tremendous challenges. In Arusha and in Rwanda, trials have failed to bring 
justice, let alone reconciliation. The justice process remains “laborious and frustrating” 
(Gaparayi 2005). In order to improve the process, Rwandan officials turned, in 1999, to the 
gacaca courts system. This is a traditional civil dispute resolution process based on a 
community approach, a form of restorative justice. Meanwhile, the national judicial system 
as well as the ICTR would continue to render justice, retributive justice. These two modes of 
transitional justice should not be seen as mere alternatives but as partners, reinforcing each 
other. Reconciliation cannot be reached without some sense of justice, provided by 
retributive justice. Nevertheless, retributive justice alone does not lead a society towards 
reconciliation. 
 
Gacaca Courts 
In Rwanda, long before the colonial period, communities developed informal neighborhood 
courts where people gathered to have disputes heard and settled claims relating to land rights, 
property damage, or minor attacks. These customary local courts are known in Kinyarwanda 
as gacaca, which literally means “justice on the grass or on lawn” and refers to the lawn 
where traditionally elders mediated the disputes of rural life in Rwanda (Reyntjens 1990). 
Gacaca was intended to “sanction the violation of rules that are shared by the community, 
with the sole objective of reconciliation through restoring harmony and social order and 
reintegration of the person who was the source of the disorder” (Tiemessen 2004: 61). The 
idea of restorative justice is at the heart of gacaca. 
A. The Resurrection of Gacaca courts 
The Rwandan government resurrected gacaca as a response to the crisis in the national 
judicial system, even though this the traditional mode of dispute resolution never dealt with 
criminal justice (Reyntjens 1990). The use of gacaca courts has been adopted as a 
mechanism to ease the burden on the national courts as well as to deal with overcrowded 
jails—the sources of many human rights violations (Organic Law No. 40/2000). Gacaca 
offers a community-based approach that emphasizes the reintegration of génocidaires back 
into the community without neglecting the victim(s). Indeed, the latter can start their healing 
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process through the truth-telling nature of the confessions. Above all, the entire community 
benefits from gacaca and engages on the path to a peaceful future.  
1. Gacaca Courts 
The government has developed a wide-scale pyramid structure for the gacaca courts; 11,000 
courts have been created at four different levels, from local (“la cellule”) to national via the 
regional and provincial levels. The law categorizes criminal responsibility through four 
categories indicating the severity of the crime committed (between October 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 1994) and the appropriate punishment. Whereas national and international 
trials deal with the most serious crimes and suspects (category 1, the leaders and planners of 
the genocide), gacaca courts judge the three other categories of suspects: from the 
perpetrators, conspirators, or accomplices of intentional homicides, to those who destroyed 
property. Unlike for category 1 crimes, the possible punishments for category 2–4 crimes do 
not include the death penalty. They range from life imprisonment to community service (see 
Table 1).  
Gacaca is a community-based approach: evidence is gathered through an audience 
participation process where all evidence is presented orally (Rwanda Supreme Court and 
Lawyers Without Borders 2005). After the debate, the verdict is given by the gacaca Seat, 
which is composed of nineteen lay judges who have been elected from among “honourable” 
Rwandans. In 2001, the gacaca Assemblies—composed of every Rwandan older than 
eighteen, in each village—elected 260,000 judges to lead the 11,000 gacaca courts around 
the country. A seven step pre-trial process (which includes drawing lists of suspects and 
witnesses, collecting evidence and establishing the appropriate categories for offences) 
preceded the actual trials. The trial itself opens with the introduction of the suspect to the 
audience and the recalling of the accusations. The accused can either plead his/her innocence 
or confess his crimes. In the former case, the gagaca Assembly members as well as the state 
prosecutor testify for or against the accused. The hearing is to be run “in a non-adversarial, 
deliberative manner, and lawyers are prohibited from taking any part in the proceedings” 
(Harrell 2003: 73). If no one testifies against the defendant and no evidence is provided, the 
accused is found not guilty by default and freed immediately. In the other cases, after the 
debate, the Seat of gacaca retires in camera to deliberate on the suspect’s guilt. The 
determination of guilt and penalty is to be made by consensus, or “failing that, a simple 
majority of the 19 will suffice” (Harrell 2003: 74). An appeal procedure enables a defendant 
to have his case heard de novo by the appellate gacaca. In the case of a confession, after a 
public hearing of the suspect’s testimony and apologies, the gacaca Assembly reflects on the 
defendant’s account and testifies as to its veracity. If, in the opinion of the Seat, the 
confession is full and complete, the defendant is granted a reduced penalty.  
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Table 1: Categorization, Confessions, and Sentencing of Genocide Suspects under 
Gacaca.  
Categories of Crimes Confession/guilt 
pleading 
Sentencing with or 
without confession)  
Competent 
Jurisdiction 
1. Planners, organizers, 
supervisors and instigators 
of the genocide; those in 
positions of authority; 
renowned murders; those 
committing rape and other 
sexual torture  
Has not made a confession  
-------------------------------- 
Has made confession prior 
to publication of their 
name on the list of alleged 
criminals of category 1  
Death or life 
imprisonment  
--------------------------- 
25 yr. to life imprisonment  
Specialized 
chamber of the 
modern court 
system  
2. Authors, co-authors, 
accomplices of those who 
killed; those having the 
intention to kill and have 
caused injury, committed 
serious violence, but not 
resulting in death  
Has not made a confession  
-------------------------------- 
Has made a confession at 
the time of trial  
-------------------------------- 
Has made confession prior 
to publication of the list of 
alleged criminals of  
category 2  
25 yr. to life imprisonment  
--------------------------- 
12 to 15 yr. imprisonment; 
half of sentence spent in 
prison, half spent in 
community service  
--------------------------- 
7 to 12 yr.; half of 
sentence spent in prison, 
half spent in community 
service  
District 
(Commune) 
Gacaca Court  
3. Those having committed 
criminal acts or participated 
in crimes without intending 
to kill  
Has not made a confession  
--------------------------------  
Has made a confession at 
the time of trial  
-------------------------------- 
Has made confession prior 
to publication of the list of 
alleged criminals of  
category 2  
5 to 7 yr.; half of sentence 
spent in prison, half spent 
in community service  
--------------------------- 
3 to 5 yr.; half of sentence 
spent in prison, half spent 
in community service  
---------------------------  
1 to 3 yr.; half of sentence 
spent in prison, half spent 
in community service  
Sector Gacaca 
Court  
4. Those having committed 
serious infractions against 
property  
----------------------------------- 
Those having committed 
serious infractions against 
property, but having made an 
agreement with the victims 
or before an authority  
No provisions  Restoration or 
reimbursement for 
property that was 
destroyed or consumed  
--------------------------- 
If the agreement is 
adequate the case is not 
brought into the courts  
Cell Gacaca 
Courts  
 
(From Pitsch 2002: 6) 
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2. Gacaca as Restorative Justice 
Although the new gacaca courts diverge largely from their traditional form, they still 
emphasize the restoration of the social order over punishment. Moreover, not only do they 
ease the burden on the conventional judicial system and on the overcrowded prisons, but they 
also foster reconciliation, starting from the community and to society as a whole. These are 
patterns of restorative justice. The community is at the heart of gacaca justice. The gacaca 
Assembly brings together every adult member of the community to judge an alleged 
perpetrator. Plea bargaining offers the perpetrator the opportunity to confess and apologize, 
and by doing so to be reintegrated into the community. This truth-telling nature of the 
confessions offers hope for reconciliation. Indeed, the “ordinary killers” wish to regain their 
humanness (Hatzfeld 2005). The lawn of the village is an appropriate starting point. A 
consensus is needed amongst the participants to decide whether to reintegrate someone into 
the community and under which conditions. What is fundamental is that a local narrative 
emerges from this interaction among victims, perpetrators and the rest of the community. 
According to Michelle Wagner, however, we should not over-estimate gacaca’s 
potential since the communities as well as the families have been destroyed and the 
community is at the core of gacaca (see Fisher 1999a). Nevertheless, gacaca brings 
recognition to the specific post-genocide demographics where the responsibilities of women 
increased dramatically (Heather 2000). For Alana Erin Tiemessen (2004: 63) “the 
community basis of gacaca allows women to participate on various levels [of the act of 
justice], recognizes their role in the reconciliation process, and brings their identity beyond 
that of victimization.” 
Furthermore, gacaca courts allocate compensation to victims. The compensation can 
take the form of community service and/or financial aid from a still-to-be-created 
governmental compensation fund. However, monetary compensation runs counter to 
Rwandan cultural norms, for which “receiving monetary compensation for human life simply 
amounts to treachery against their loved ones” (Gabiro 2002). Above all, some sort of 
compensation is needed to establish the foundations of a peaceful society. 
With the gacaca courts, in addition to the national and international trials, Rwanda is 
pursuing a “dual-pronged goal to justice and reconciliation” (Fullerton 2003: 8). No peace 
can be built upon impunity and injustice, but no lasting peace can be built without 
reconciliation, either. Gacaca courts and their emotional texture set the stage for the creation 
of local narrative on which the community can base its reconciliation. Gacaca seems to be 
able to promote both justice and reconciliation; the following section will assess this hope. 
B. Trying Genocide through Gacaca 
On March 10, 2005, the first trials opened in 113 gacaca courts throughout Rwanda. Two 
days later, the first sentence was rendered. Today, the enterprise is still at its very beginning. 
Above all, the modernized gacaca is controversial.  
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1. Due Process and Fairness 
The most widely voiced concern about gacaca is that “due legal process will be 
compromised and the rights of the defendants ignored.” The OAU report continues with 
“speed and efficiency, important as they are, must also be accompanied by fairness. Basic 
Human rights must not be sacrificed either to productivity or local participation” 
(Organization for African Unity 2000b). The gacaca system profoundly compromises 
principles of justice as defined by criminal law standards (Uvin 2000). There is no separation 
between prosecutor and judge, no legal counsel for the defendant, no legally reasoned 
verdict. There is strong pressure for self-incrimination (the plea bargaining); a potential risk 
for major divergences in punishment (though the comité de coordination’s role is to ensure 
uniformity in the decision process throughout Rwanda); a threat of intimidation towards the 
gacaca organs, witnesses, and defendants; and a risk of “vigilante’s justice” (Daly 2002: 
383) where vengeance and will of empowerment may dominate the accusations. Moreover, 
the competence and expertise of the gacaca judges, whose role will determine the decisions 
that emanate from the court, is questionable.  
Nonetheless, for Michael Ignatieff (2002: 35), “while gacaca certainly falls far short 
of international ‘fair trial’ standards, insistence on the latter could result only in much more 
serious violations of the rights of those accused who would remain in prison indefinitely, 
absent any alternative means of determining their guilt or innocence.” Similarly, Peter Uvin 
identifies the cultural inappropriateness of the international law critiques of gacaca courts: 
“the practice of Gacaca may well be able to respect key conditions of fair trial and due 
process, but in an original, locally appropriate form, and not in the usual western-style form” 
(Uvin 2000: 5). Here lies one of the major issues: the implementation of safeguards, in order 
to respect the international criminal standards, may reinvent the same formal justice system 
that is clearly not working. Yet, the government, with the support of the international 
community, should seek to put into place a system that maximizes the positive potentials and 
minimizes the negative ones. Foremost, the evaluation of gacaca should not only focus on 
the judicial level, for it is primarily a social and political experiment. 
2. Victor’s Justice 
In July 1994, the bloodbath stopped with the victory of the RPF over the official government 
in the ongoing civil war, and the subsequent fleeing of extremist Hutu to neighboring Congo. 
As already mentioned, not all the victims were Tutsi and not all killers were Hutu. It is true 
that the Tutsi forces of the RPF ended the genocide, but meanwhile they committed 
numerous atrocities. Human Rights Watch estimated the number of people killed by Tutsi 
forces to be at least 25,000 to 30,000 people. This is one of the most sensitive chapters of the 
genocide’s history (Fisher 1999b). If justice through gacaca is to promote reconciliation (as 
the government officials claim) it cannot be a victor’s justice. The legitimacy of gacaca 
constitutes one of the keys for its success. Gacaca courts should not be used by the Tutsi 
(who proclaim Rwanda to be an ethnicity-free country where ethnic divisions are obsolete) to 
protect their hold on power and ensure their survival. In fact, according to Filip Reyntjens 
(2004: 187), “tutsification” is occurring, leading Rwanda to a Tusti ethnocracy. Hence, the 
policy of eliminating ethnicity is a political tool to legitimate Tusti authority. Above all, 
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gacaca jurisdictions should be free from any power holders’ interference especially 
regarding the crimes perpetrated by the RPF forces. 
3. Towards Reconciliation 
The modernized gacaca pursues a twofold goal: speeding up the trials and emptying the 
prisons; and involving the community (including the victims) in establishing the truth and, 
through that, promoting reconciliation. Rwandan officials believe that without justice no 
reconciliation is possible. Hence, gacaca jurisdictions not only seek the discovery of the truth 
via the full confession and plea bargaining processes, but also punish the perpetrators. The 
end of the culture of impunity is an essential ingredient of gacaca courts. Indeed, generalized 
amnesty is currently politically and socially out of the question. Gacaca, as a community-
based approach of both justice and reconciliation, emphasizes the relationship between 
victims, perpetrators, and the rest of the village. It tries to heal the suffering of the victims 
and to reintegrate the perpetrator after he/she has confessed and apologized. The effort 
demanded from the victims is tremendous: they have to publicly re-open the wounds that 
they painfully have tried to close. Yet Priscillia Hayner (2001) believes that we, as a 
community composed of victims, perpetrators and bystanders, need to remember past 
atrocities in order to forget them. 
Moreover, the objective is to restore the social order and to integrate the person who 
was the source of the disorder. Gacaca offers a shame-based rather than a guilt-based 
remedy. Such remedies constitute the best response to radical evil (Nino 1996). When 
violence occurs in situations where acting violently is simply not deviant (i.e., radical evil), 
punishment and retribution do not prevent radical evil from re-occurring and do not restore 
the broken social order. In fact, shame, a consciousness of one’s own responsibility, is 
accompanied with “feelings of regret, blameworthiness, and sometimes even disgrace” 
(Drumbl 2000: 1257). Gacaca can offer re-integrative shaming to the génocidaires. This 
tremendous endeavor to heal engages a last actor. The international community must 
financially support this effort. Its role is vital especially if it is accompanied by an 
“accompagnement critique” (Digneffe and Fierens 2003: 78) that would encourage Rwandan 
officials to improve the gacaca system. The revival and transformation of the traditional 
gacaca will elicit many different reactions from Rwandans who, however, are willing to give 
gacaca a chance since it seems to be the only reasonable solution. 
 
Truth Commission 
In countries emerging from periods of gross violations of human rights, the question of how 
to deal with the past needs to be resolved if the country is to progress towards a peaceful 
future. In post-genocide Rwanda, retributive justice was implemented first to deal with the 
past. The failure of national and international trials to bring either justice or reconciliation 
has encouraged the government to turn to a traditional—though modernized—mode of 
justice: gacaca. Yet, another mode of restorative justice could have been implemented: a 
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truth and reconciliation commission.14 In this section, I suggest a theoretical framework for 
the use of such a commission in Rwanda considering both its pitfalls and benefits. 
A. The Turn Towards Truth 
On their visits to South Africa in 1996 and 1997, Rwandan officials commented that justice 
was needed in order to engage with the process of reconciliation: “there can be no 
reconciliation with victims unless there has been justice” (Sarkin 2001: 154). The emphasis 
was on justice, not on truth.  
1. From Justice to Truth 
According to Priscilla Hayner (2001: 14), “the limited reach of the courts and […] the 
recognition that even successful prosecution do not resolve the conflict and pain associated 
with past abuses” explain the turn toward truth-seeking as a central component of the 
response to past atrocities. Martha Minow (1998: 87–88) favorably explores the usefulness of 
public inquiries and truth commissions as well-suited mechanisms to meet goals for societal 
responses to collective violence. Truth commissions should be utilized to pursue efforts at 
reconstituting a united society. The truth-seeking process promotes collective accountability, 
heals the victims, generates the record of the human rights violations, and therefore roots out 
the causes of genocide and minimizes future violence. 
Rwanda’s history shows a turn towards truth in 1993. Following the signing of the 
Arusha agreement between the government and the armed opposition, Rwandan human 
rights organizations set up an international commission to investigate violence committed by 
the belligerents during the civil war (Hayner 2001: 17–20). The effectiveness of the 
commission was undermined by the resentment of both ruling and opposition groups, which 
led to ongoing violence while the commissioners were investigating. The murders of 
potential witnesses impinged upon the truth-telling, reconciliation, and healing process. 
However, when the report was published in 1993, the response was positive in both Rwanda 
and Europe. “The commission’s work served an important function in promoting 
international awareness of the Rwanda crisis” (Sarkin 1999: 778–79). Nevertheless, the 
report, which concentrated on human rights abuses committed by the government forces, was 
despised by Rwandan officials. Most important of all, the report and its recommendations 
failed to prevent the outbreak of genocide one year later.  
2. Learning from Others 
Thus far, eighteen truth commissions have dealt with gross human rights violations 
throughout the world. Lessons can be learned from these experiences. Priscilla Hayner (2001: 
24), in her insightful account of official truth bodies, notes that “though with varying degrees 
of emphasis, a truth commission may have any or all of the following five basic aims: to 
discover, clarify, and formally acknowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of 
                                                
14 I use the terms truth commission and truth and reconciliation commission to refer to the same 
concept—a process of truth-seeking via the establishment of an independent body that has the task of 
investigating past atrocities and reporting its findings. 
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victims; to contribute to justice and accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and 
recommend reforms; and to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past.” These 
goals set the stage for reflection on the possibility of a Rwandan truth commission to 
investigate the past. 
B. A Theoretical Framework 
Although the post-genocide Rwandan government has never considered the opportunity of 
utilizing a truth commission to deal with the past, the benefits and pitfalls of such bodies 
have been raised in the literature on transitional justice (Drumbl 2000; Hayner 2001; Minow 
1998; Sarkin 1999; Sarkin 2001).  
1. A Truth Commission in Rwanda: Benefits and Pitfalls 
The establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission in Rwanda could be a means of 
healing Rwandans’ wounds, beginning reconciliation and rebuilding a unified country, and 
therefore reducing the risks of future conflicts. Moreover, such a commission could have 
been the response to the criminal judicial system’s inability to cope with the legacy of the 
genocide. Instead, the Rwandan government opted for the revival of gacaca. Unlike gacaca 
courts, a truth commission has the potential to (re)write a collective narrative upon which 
peace can be built.  
The important issue here is timing—when to launch the process? Herein lies the 
paradox: if there is still ongoing strife, the time might never be right; but the longer we wait, 
the greater the damage to the society as a whole.15 In the case of Rwanda, since the genocide 
itself was ended by the seizure of power by the RPF in July 1994, the time is right for a truth 
commission, even though violence still occurs in some parts of the country. 
On the basis of public accounts, a truth commission can draw a picture of the human 
rights abuses that is as complete as possible, and above all make it publicly known. It 
includes the nature and the extent of the crimes as well as a record of the names and fates of 
the victims. This narrative of the atrocities and the underlying forces that led to them would 
hinder “the current tendency of the Hutu to deny of the genocide [and] at the same time 
justify their actions on the basis of their own perceived losses” (Sarkin 1999: 798). Martha 
Minow (1998: 47, 58–59, 78) suggests that truth commissions may be more effective than 
trials at establishing an incontrovertible historical record. It is on the foundations of this new 
narrative—accepted by all—that Rwandans can establish a new united society. Furthermore, 
a truth commission could provide victims “a forum through which to reclaim their dignity 
and perpetrators will have a channel through which to expiate their guilt” (Sarkin 2000: 167). 
Rwanda remains a traumatized country, and Rwandans need a means to release their pain and 
allow them to live together in a peaceful society. A truth commission could offer such a 
possibility: victims could tell the truth and vent their hostilities in a controlled and non-
violent manner. Retributive justice leaves unaddressed the important need to treat depression 
                                                
15 Priscilla Hayner observes that there is a “the quicker the better” rule (2001: 221). See also, Sarkin 
(1999: 798). 
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in Rwanda, which is populated by the bapfuye buhagazi, the “walking dead” (Drumbl 2000: 
1270). A truth and reconciliation commission can facilitate a national catharsis since it 
creates the conditions for mourning and grieving. Meanwhile, génocidaires would be given 
the opportunity to expiate their wrongdoings and apologize to the victims or their families. 
The dialogue coming out of the truth may lead all Rwandans to live peacefully together.  
To achieve collective reconciliation, a society needs individual forgiveness. While “it 
is senseless to make generalizations about forgiveness, they are nevertheless important 
insights that can be gleaned” (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003: 98) from experiences of dealing 
with past atrocities. Atonement from the perpetrators eases forgiveness (Brooks 2004: 163–
169). To forgive means neither to forget nor to lose (Tutu 1999). The act of forgiving can 
heal grief, forge a new relationship, and break the cycles of violence (Minow 1998: 14). In 
Rwanda, no one can force any survivor to forgive; yet a truth and reconciliation commission 
could facilitate the restoration of the relationship between victims and perpetrators, which 
may lead to the tender of apologies by génocidaires, followed by forgiveness from the 
victims. In turn, the transformation of that relationship will strengthen the process of 
reconciliation. In this context, should amnesty be granted? Mark Drumbl claims that 
“amnesty could heighten the comprehensiveness of the historical record,” but should be 
“accompanied by apologies, public yet re-integrative shaming and compensation for the 
victims” (2000: 1274). However, international law prohibits the granting of amnesty for the 
gross violations of human rights. Foremost, the decision to grant amnesty, and under what 
conditions, belongs to Rwandans. 
Nonetheless, a truth and reconciliation commission holds “the potential of opening up 
old wounds, renewing resentment and hostility against the perpetrators of abuses” (Sarkin 
1999: 800). Moreover, the success of the commission will rely greatly on its legitimacy. 
Independent commissioners should seek a truth shared by all Rwandans and not only a 
victor’s truth. Hence, the participation of both Tutsi and Hutu is a sine qua non condition. In 
addition to being legitimate in the eyes of all Rwandans, a truth commission should be 
tailored to both the country’s current situation and its history. Only such a commission would 
provide the best chance of success for the laborious task of leading a country towards 
national reconciliation. To maximize the chances of successful truth-seeking as well as of 
reconciliation, the truth and reconciliation commission must be carefully designed and the 
right persons ought to be appointed. 
2. The Process 
Establishment of the Commission. The majority of truth commissions have been established 
by presidential decree (Hayner 2001: 214). However, if a law creates the commission, this 
allows a broader mandate and reflects the will of the whole nation to seek truth, and not the 
new government’s particular will. Additionally, a neutral process for appointment of the 
commissioners must be guaranteed. An independent, well-balanced commission is critical to 
ensure that Rwandans regard it as legitimate and credible and therefore are willing to partici-
pate. On the basis of the Salvadoran experience, Jeremy Sarkin (1999: 806) proposes that a 
panel of personalities, a mix of Rwandan and foreigners, appoint Rwandan commissioners. 
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This approach benefits from the combined involvement of the international community and a 
truth commission staffed and run by Rwandans.  
 
Mandate. The commission needs a broad mandate to attain its goal of delivering an official 
record of the past atrocities. The investigated time period should not be reduced to the three 
months of the actual genocide, but should include the civil war period as well as the post-
genocide period. This would avoid blaming only one group of the population. Both Hutu and 
Tutsi have committed massive murders and both Tutsi and Hutu have suffered from them. 
The types of human rights abuses that would be examined as well as the scope of the rights 
need to be defined beforehand. In addition, the parameters of what truth is to be recorded 
(and how), and what level of proof is needed could be defined by the panel (Hayner 2001: 
228–33).  
Publicity. In countries such as Rwanda, “where a primary goal of a truth commission is to 
advance understanding and reconciliation and to reduce animosities” (Hayner 2001: 228) 
there are persuasive reasons to hold public hearings. By giving the victims a chance to tell 
their story publicly, a commission acknowledges their sufferings and helps to release their 
pain. By bringing the survivors’ voices to the public (aired on television and radio), a 
commission can encourage public understanding and sympathy for the victims, and therefore 
reduce the denial of the truth by some Hutu. In Rwanda, using the same means that called for 
the killings—the radio—to promote reconciliation could have a symbolic effect on the entire 
population. 
Resources. A truth commission is extremely time and resource intensive (Hayner 2001: 227). 
This huge cost should be shared by the international community. Foreign countries could 
financially support the organization of the panel and the commission—therefore it would not 
rely on governmental funding—as well as provide logistical aid in the field of information 
management and analysis. This latter point, though very important in the establishment of the 
record of the abuses, is usually not given enough attention. Commissioners from countries 
that have experienced a truth commission (for instance, South Africa) could help Rwandans 
to implement and carry on their own truth-seeking.  
Final Report. The raison d’être of a truth commission is the establishment of an official 
record of the past abuses. The hope is that such a report, listing the causes, the nature, and the 
extent of the atrocities as well as the names of the victims, brings Rwandans to acknowledge 
the same truth. On the foundations of that truth, and after apologies from the perpetrators 
followed by compensation, reparation, and some sense of forgiveness, Rwandans can build 
together a united and peaceful future where a culture of human rights and the rule of law 
reign. 
3. Challenging the Past and Shaping the Future 
The legitimacy of such a commission constitutes a key element of its success. Should it be 
absent, reconciliation would remain a vain hope. The establishment of the truth-seeking 
process ought to seek the inclusion of every Rwandan. Although there is no “objective truth, 
it is critical that the version of “the truth” […] embraces the experience of all” (Sarkin 1999: 
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802). Therefore, a positive attitude of the government is vital. On the one hand, the 
endorsement by the government of the project would show its will to seek the truth—even 
though it has to admit its responsibility for abuses committed by it—and such support would 
encourage an honest and full participation of all. On the other hand, the Rwandan 
government should avoid interference; otherwise the commission would be viewed by the 
Hutu as victor’s justice. In countries where a legitimacy crisis faces the newly established 
government, the work of a truth commission, if successful, can improve the legitimacy of the 
new government and thus create the conditions for reconciliation. 
A truth commission could address the problem of land disputes. Since the genocide, 
latent conflict over property has been a major source of tension. “As Hutu refugees return 
[from exile], they find others on the land they used to occupy. Fear of being denounced as 
genocide perpetrators stops many from reclaiming their land” (Sarkin 1999: 786). A special 
committee of land disputes could be created within the truth and reconciliation commission. 
Its task could be limited to the collection of testimonies over land disputes, followed by 
recommendations for the government or encompass a mission of mediation between parties. 
Above all, the committee should provide a forum where land disputes can be discussed 
without the fear of being accused of participation the mass murders.  
We can conclude the design of the framework for a Rwandan truth commission with 
Priscillia Hayner’s (2001: 9) words: “the decision to dig into the details of a difficult past 
must always be left to a country and its people to decide, and in some countries there may be 
reasons to leave the past well alone.” Only a truth commission designed for Rwandans by 
Rwandans has a chance of success—bringing Rwanda towards reconciliation via the 
acknowledgment by all Rwandans of a common historical record based on the stories of both 
victims and perpetrators. 
 
Conclusions 
Gacaca versus Truth Commission? 
Three different responses have addressed post-genocide Rwanda. The first two—national and 
international trials—quickly demonstrated their inability to bring justice or reconciliation. In 
order to ease the judicial burden and deal with the overcrowded jails, the Rwandan 
government resurrected and transformed the traditional gacaca, a mode of restorative justice. 
Moreover, gacaca bears the potential to restore the social order via the participation of the 
whole community in the healing process. Victims are offered a forum through which they 
can reclaim their dignity, and gacaca provides the perpetrators with a channel through which 
they can expiate their guilt and tender apologies. The public accounts and hearings generate 
local narratives on which a better future will be built and thus lead Rwandans to 
reconciliation. 
In the particular context of post-genocide Rwanda, the restorative benefits of a truth 
commission would be similar to the benefits brought by gacaca. Both modes need the same 
conditions to be successful: support from the rulers and international community but not 
interference; protection and participation for all (victims, alleged génocidaires, and the rest 
of the community); and above all, legitimacy.  
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Table 2: Comparison Gacaca versus Truth Commission. 
Institutional Component Gacaca Truth Commission 
Goals Justice for reconciliation Truth for reconciliation 
Institution Court Commission 
Members 
“Honourable” community 
members for the Seat; the 
whole community for the 
Assembly 
Independent Rwandan 
commissioners chosen on the basis 
of their competences 
Crimes investigated Crimes from cat. 2 to cat. 4 To be defined by the panel 
Punishment Imprisonment; reintegration No punishment but recommendations 
Amnesty 
No amnesty but reduced 
penalty in case of full 
confession 
To be defined by the panel 
Time-period From Jan. 1, 1990 to  Dec. 31, 1994 To be defined by the panel 
Publicity Among the community Throughout Rwanda via radio 
Process Trials; negotiations Investigations; publics hearings 
Burden of proof Testimonies; accusations Testimonies 
Narrative Local narratives that can vary One single narrative established in an official record 
Compensation and reparation Depends on nature of crime To be defined by the panel 
Protection For victims, perpetrators, witnesses, and judges 
For victims, perpetrators, 
witnesses, and commissioners  
Role of the Rwandan government Support but no interference Support but no interference 
Role of the international 
community 
Support (financial and 
logistical) and 
"accompagnement critique" 
Support (financial and logistical) 
and participation in the panel  
 
 
20    Min Reuchamps 
 
Yet, gacaca and a truth commission diverge on a fundamental premise. Whereas 
gacaca seeks justice for reconciliation, a truth commission seeks truth for reconciliation. The 
raison d’être of a truth and reconciliation commission is the establishment of an official 
record of the past atrocities based on the public accounts of both the victims and perpetrators. 
Such a clarification of history results, according to Roy Brooks (2004: 148), to “a collective 
judgment regarding the magnitude of the injustice, including its lingering effects, and the 
extent of the perpetrator’s responsibility.” A truth commission could explore Robert Lifton’s 
notion of “atrocity-producing situation” (Lifton 1986; Lifton and Markusen 1990) in the 
particular case of Rwanda where many “ordinary people” transformed into “ordinary killers.” 
The final report could describe not only the actual chain of events, but also the mechanisms 
of the 1994 mass murders, the characters of the planning, and the underlying forces that 
compelled so many Rwandans to participate in the bloodbath. Moreover, Elazar Barkan 
suggests that “setting the historical record straight can fuse polarized antagonistic histories 
into a core of shared history to which both sides can subscribe” (2000). It would help post-
genocide Rwanda to create what Jürgen Habermas (1990) calls “discourse ethics,” a set of 
norms on which people with different interests can agree. A truth commission could deal best 
with this crucial issue of establishing a legitimate historical record and should therefore be 
implemented. 
Next to national and international trials, which must continue to prosecute the leaders 
and the architects of the genocide in symbolic trials, a truth commission should operate 
conjunctively with gacaca proceedings. Although the latter are controversial as shown in this 
article, they constitute the only reasonable solution for post-genocide Rwanda. Thus, the 
truth-seeking body could foster the establishment of a new narrative shared by all Rwandans 
on the basis of the local narratives that came from the emotional texture of gacaca public 
hearings but which also may largely vary from one community to another, especially be-
tween majority-Hutu and majority-Tutsi communities. This new narrative could encompass 
the ideal of an ethnicity-free country as promoted by the Rwandan officials (Bonner 1994b; 
McKinley 1996; Lacey 2004b). The interaction between trials, gacaca, and a truth commis-
sion can shed light onto collective responsibility as well as on individual responsibility. The 
conjunction of these three different responses to post-genocide Rwanda has the potential to 
engage Rwandans onto the path towards reconciliation. Furthermore, the international 
community, which did little while atrocities were committed, owes it to Rwandans to assist 
them in providing support and resources to ensure that such a perilous exercise has the best 
chance of success.  
Eventually, alongside justice and truth seeking processes, memorials and new 
symbols (Agence France Presse 2002; Lacey 2001; Lacey 2004b) encourage the 
reconciliation of a united nation and above all favorably shape a new narrative, which if 
shared by all Rwandans constitutes the best protection against the reoccurrence of radical 
evil. 
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